Washington’s trade sanctions and tariff threats can hit Thailand where it hurts. They can squeeze export industries, rattle investor confidence and raise the cost of doing business with the US. In a normal policy dispute, that kind of pressure can create incentives to compromise. But a border conflict driven by nationalist politics and security institutions does not operate like a normal policy dispute. Sanctions can hurt Thailand, yet still fail to stop aggression, because they do not automatically change the political rewards that hardliners expect to harvest from confrontation.
The first reason is timing. Thailand is heading toward another election cycle in a climate of political uncertainty. In that atmosphere, economic pressure from abroad can be reframed as evidence that foreign powers are bullying Thailand or taking sides. When leaders face a legitimacy problem at home, external pressure becomes an opportunity to rally voters around the flag.
It shifts debate away from accountability and toward defiance. That is not an accident. It is a familiar script in nationalist politics. If the public is told that the country is being punished for defending its sovereignty, hardship becomes something to endure proudly rather than a reason to demand restraint.
This is where the war logic becomes resilient. War logic is not only about military plans. It is about political incentives that reward escalation and punish compromise. Once the conflict is packaged as a test of national pride, even sensible de-escalation can be portrayed as weakness.
Opponents of the government risk being smeared as disloyal if they argue for mediation or concessions. As a result, trade sanctions can ironically strengthen the very forces they are meant to restrain, by giving conservatives and security hawks a story that unifies their base.
A second reason is the balance of power inside Thailand’s political system. Since Prayut’s era ended, civilian politics has been more competitive, but the military establishment has not vanished from decision making. It has adjusted. In moments of crisis, security institutions regain influence because they can claim expertise, urgency and national necessity.
The more intense the confrontation becomes, the more the public expects a security response. That expectation opens space for generals and hardline planners to shape policy, even under a civilian government, especially when coalition politics is fragile and leaders fear losing control of the narrative.
Sanctions do little to disrupt that institutional dynamic. Economic pain falls on businesses, workers and consumers, while security decision makers often remain insulated, politically protected and even empowered by the crisis atmosphere.
If the sanction strategy is broad, it can punish ordinary livelihoods without directly narrowing the room for military adventurism. If it is selective, it can still be framed as a hostile act by outsiders. Either way, it does not necessarily break the cycle that produces escalation.
A third reason is strategic confidence in future repair. Thai conservatives and the military establishment can look beyond the immediate discomfort and see a longer game. Thailand remains a significant security partner of the US in ASEAN. It has deep defence ties, long standing military cooperation and a strategic role in regional balancing against China.
That reality feeds a belief in Bangkok that the relationship is resilient. Hardliners can calculate that US will eventually return to business as usual, because US also has interests at stake. In that view, sanctions are temporary weather, not a permanent climate. Absorb them now, win domestic advantage, then let a future government restore trade negotiations and smooth relations when the political moment changes.
This belief is reinforced by electoral logic. If Anutin and conservative forces foresee political advantage from appearing firm, they may treat sanctions as manageable collateral damage. In the short term, they can blame the pain on foreign pressure rather than their own choices. In the medium term, they can campaign as the defenders who stood up to outsiders. In the longer term, if they lose popularity or lose power, they can still hope the next government will quietly rebuild ties with US and seek to lift penalties.
Either way, the incentive to compromise today remains weak if the anticipated political payoff from confrontation is strong.
None of this means sanctions are useless. They can create friction among elites, especially among export sectors and business groups that prefer stability. They can signal international disapproval and constrain some forms of economic cooperation. They can also deter further escalation if they are paired with credible diplomatic pathways and coordinated messaging. But sanctions alone are not a ceasefire plan. They are not a mechanism for changing the internal political calculus that makes aggression attractive.
If the goal is to end the war logic, the strategy must target the logic itself. That means reducing the political rewards of escalation and increasing the political benefits of restraint. It means widening the coalition for de-escalation so that compromise is framed as national interest rather than humiliation.
It also means building transparency and documentation around incidents so that propaganda has less room to operate. A conflict narrative survives on ambiguity and emotion. Clear facts, independent monitoring and consistent regional messaging can make it harder for any side to claim innocence while escalating.
For Cambodia, this requires a dual track approach. The first track is diplomatic, strengthening regional and international pressure through ASEAN mechanisms, observer arrangements and coordinated statements that keep the focus on restraint, investigation, and lawful dispute settlement. The second track is domestic credibility, showing that Cambodia’s position is rooted in law, transparency and the protection of civilians, not in revenge politics. When Cambodia’s diplomacy is steady and evidence based, it becomes harder for Bangkok to justify continued escalation as defensive necessity.
For the US, if it wants trade leverage to matter, it must be paired with diplomacy that offers exits rather than corners. Pressure without pathways encourages defiance. Pressure with clear off ramps can empower moderates. Targeted measures that focus on decision makers and networks tied to escalation, combined with incentives for verified de-escalation, are more likely to shape behaviour than broad punishment that fuels nationalism.
Sanctions can hurt Thailand. They can create real economic discomfort and political noise. But they will not automatically end the war logic, because the war logic is sustained by elections, institutions and narratives that convert external pressure into domestic advantage. The central challenge is not only raising the cost of aggression. It is removing the political payoff that keeps aggression alive.
Seng Vanly is an Independent Geopolitical Analyst. The views and opinions expressed are his own.
