The midnight ceasefire on July 28, should have been a widely welcomed and earnestly debated milestone, offering the sole means to halt further casualties in the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict. Instead, two ASPI analysts seized the moment on July 29 to amplify unverified Thai accusations of Cambodian ceasefire breaches.
Most critically, Angela Suriyasenee and Nathan Ruser, in their article published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) in The Strategist, frame this volatile situation as a premeditated escalation orchestrated by Cambodia, shifting blame to its leaders for allegedly exploiting Thai domestic political and economic fractures for territorial gains.
Drawing on satellite imagery, official reports and a contentious tally of 33 escalatory events attributed to Cambodia against 14 by Thailand, they assert that Cambodia’s actions — road construction, troop deployments and alleged landmine placements — ignited the violence, resulting in at least 40 deaths and the displacement of over 300,000 people across both nations. Yet, this narrative oversimplifies a deeply rooted dispute, selectively highlighting Cambodian manoeuvres while downplaying Thailand’s provocative role, underlying power dynamics and recognisable political patterns. Hence, I am compelled to provide a meticulous reassessment of the evidence to challenge ASPI analysts biased portrayal and unmask predetermined narratives.
Thai Politics and Military Autonomy
Politically, the analysts mischaracterise the leaked Paetongtarn-Hun Sen call as border-tension-focused, when it primarily addressed easing checkpoint schedules request by Thai Prime Minister, fuelling Thailand’s nationalist backlash and Paetongtarn’s suspension. Thailand’s growing military autonomy — evidenced by the army’s authorisation on border closures and the imposition of martial law — drives significant escalation, yet ASPI Analysts fixates on Cambodia, reflecting a bias toward Thailand. Why has the Thai army suddenly gained prominence?
The authors totally ignore a historical fact that Thailand exhibits a recurring political pattern where a challenged civilian government, losing grip to a resurgent military, shifts focus to border disputes with Cambodia to stoke nationalist sentiment and bolster political legitimacy. This dynamic is rooted in Thailand’s history of military coups (e.g., 2006, 2014) and is evident in past conflicts like the 2008-11 Preah Vihear dispute, triggered during the Samak Sundaravej government’s instability post-2006 coup. In 2025, the suspension of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra on July 1, amid a leaked call with Hun Sen, coincided with military-led escalations — unilateral border closures since June 6, F-16 airstrikes on July 24, and martial law on July 25 — suggesting a deliberate pivot to the Cambodia border to divert attention from domestic crises. The military’s autonomy, historical rejection of ICJ rulings and exploitation of Cambodia as a scapegoat to mask internal power struggles, a pattern critiqued by analysts like Matt Wheeler, challenging the establishment narrative of Thailand’s reactive defence.
A critical aspect to assess regarding Thailand’s potential intentional provocation involves the inflammatory remarks attributed to Thai 2nd Regional Commander Boonsin Padklang, which both authors did not mention. On June 14, while addressing military students, he allegedly declared “This is my land. If you want it, let’s duel,” implying a readiness for direct confrontation. Subsequently, in early July, speaking to teachers and students at a school ceremony, he reportedly boasted that he could secure a decisive victory within three days, and potentially the downfall of Phnom Penh. If substantiated, these remarks underscore Thailand’s provocative intent, revealing a resolve to fight and an underestimation of its adversary that could signal a motive for gaining strategic advantage through conflict.
Evidence Selectivity
Suriyasenee and Ruser highlight Cambodia’s late-2024 road upgrades near Preah Vihear and troop movements from March to May as calculated acts of aggression, purportedly masked as infrastructure development to alter territorial realities. However, this narrative lacks critical context. Instead of acknowledging a tense backdrop, the authors cite the February 13 incident at Ta Mone Thom temple — where Thai soldiers admonished a group of Khmer visitors for singing the Cambodian national anthem — as the spark, overlooking its provocative nature. Cambodia’s subsequent fortifications near Chong Bok (known as Mom Bei in Khmer) and the mountainous vicinity of Preah Vihear temple, alongside Thailand’s unstated April road-building at Ta Mone Thom Temple, reflect reciprocal defensive posturing rather than unilateral intent. The ASPI’s 33-to-14 event ratio, framing Cambodia as the sole escalator, exaggerates Cambodian actions — driven by a 124,300-strong force reliant on outdated T-55 tanks — while downplaying Thailand’s deployment of 360,000 troops and F-16 airstrikes on July 24. This swift aerial response, executed within hours, undermines ASPI’s depiction of Thailand as merely reactive, revealing a methodological or selective bias.
Scholarly definitions of an “escalatory event,” as outlined by Thomas Schelling in The Strategy of Conflict (1960) and Robert Jervis in Perception and Misperception in International Politics (1976), necessitate intentional provocation or a significant increase in hostile forces. Cambodia’s road projects, spurred by decades of slow post-war recovery following the Khmer Rouge era and other 1980s-1990s conflicts, represent a deliberate and substantial infrastructure initiative, devoid of the intentional provocation or hostile escalation required to qualify as such an event. These efforts align with a defensive strategy, aimed at securing disputed territories in response to Thailand’s increasingly hostile border posture since the February 13 incident, rather than inciting war. The authors’ classification of escalatory events, lacking a rigorous definition, casts serious doubt on the interpretive rigor of their analysis.
Evidence selectivity further erodes their credibility. The analysts highlight Cambodia’s deployment of BM-21 rockets and T-55 tanks near the Emerald Triangle by late June, framing these as offensive, yet Thailand’s military superiority — boasting Gripens, VT-4 tanks and a tenfold GDP advantage — suggests Cambodia’s actions were defensive against a formidable neighbour. Landmine incidents on July 23, injuring Thai soldiers with alleged new PMN-2 mines, are accepted based on Thai claims without UN verification, despite Cambodia’s Mine Action Authority attributing these to munitions from decades of conflict. However, Thailand’s July 24 installation of barbed wire at Ta Mone Thom Temple, damaging a UNESCO World Heritage site, and its expulsion of Cambodia’s ambassador without diplomatic protocol are conspicuously absent from ASPI’s analysis. These moves, signalling aggression, are sanitised as “tactical positioning”, revealing a skewed lens.
Half Truths
Economically, Thailand’s post-call crackdown on scam centres, spurred by Chinese and UN pressure on its regional crime hub status, strained relations, yet Cambodia’s alleged coercion defies logic against a foe with a $543 billion GDP versus Cambodia’s $32 billion. The authors vaguely blame Cambodia’s economic frictions due to Thailand’s crackdown of scam centres and timber smugglings to justify timing of Cambodia’s planned invasion is also misleading. To clarify, Thailand has been widely recognised as a regional hub for scam centres, as noted by the UN, facing significant pressure from China for immediate actions. It is unjust to single out Cambodia and heap all blames onto neighbouring countries like Cambodia and Myanmar, especially when evidence from the UN report suggests Thailand could be the central stronghold for these criminal operations, potentially overshadowing its role as the linchpin in this regional crisis. This selective spotlight risks distorting the broader narrative, conveniently deflecting scrutiny from Thailand’s own complicity amid its domestic political turmoil.
‘Unnamed’ Official Reports
The credibility of the “official reports” cited by Angela Suriyasenee and Nathan Ruser in their analysis is highly questionable without specific details about their origin, content or issuing authority. Merely invoking the term “official” to assert authority is insufficient, as it leaves their claims vague and unsubstantiated, raising doubts about whether these reports are government documents, military intelligence or other sources. The lack of transparency regarding how the authors accessed these reports — whether through privileged channels, leaked data or unverified submissions — further undermines their reliability. Without clear identification or public availability, this reliance on unnamed “official reports” risks being an empty assertion, potentially tailored to fit a predetermined narrative.
So What is It Then?
This conflict finds its origins in shared historical roots: the 1904 and 1907 Franco-Siamese treaties, the 2008–2011 clashes and the unresolved provocation of the May 28, 2025 incident that killed a Cambodian soldier, to which Thailand has offered no response. Despite being accused of a provocative stance and labelled a premeditated aggressor, Cambodia has steadfastly pursued peaceful resolution and sought settlement through diplomatic channels and international law. What proves more challenging is government of Cambodia negotiating with Thailand, where multiple authorities clutter the negotiation theatre, compelling its government to consult the military on every aspect of this conflict. The authors, however, fail to address these facts with the proportionality they demand, skewing the narrative in favour of their biased perspective.
The Way Forward
To truly understand the Thailand-Cambodia conflict and identify the real instigators, we must move beyond predetermined narratives and examine key factors: Why would Cambodia initiate a war, and what strategic gain — beyond risking international backlash — could it possibly achieve? How has Cambodia consistently pursued resolution through diplomatic channels and ICJ appeals over this century-old dispute? Why would it break a ceasefire its people and government urgently require? Similarly, we must question Thailand’s motives and what benefits outweigh the risks? A risk-versus-benefit analysis for both sides, rooted in their actions and domestic pressures, is essential to uncover the true troublemakers driving this conflict.
Peace necessitates balanced accountability, not the vilification of Cambodia as claimed by one of the co-authors, whose nationality is Thai. This highlights concerns about ethical integrity and a potential inherent conflict of interest, compelling the analyst to rise above national allegiance to deliver a fair, evidence-based assessment. For the sake of fairness, Ruser’s satellite expertise should be harnessed to illuminate the July 28 breaches, providing clarity to balance the evidence and bolster the credibility of his prior analysis. It is perilous for the authors to assert a nation’s premeditated escalation during an active conflict, perpetuating the dangerous circulation of predetermined narratives that distort the truth.
Soth Sothearak holds a Master’s Degree in Strategic Studies, and serves as defence attaché at the Cambodian embassy to Australia. The views and opinions expressed are his own, and do not represent the official position of the Cambodian government.
